Ship Security
Excerpt
A wee sample from the intro to a security manual I’m publishing soon. The main lesson is, yes, lots and lots of people who you’ve never harmed, seen or heard of, would like to kill you. Here are things you can do to stop them. Most of you probably won’t want to buy it, unless you operate a marine training centre, but I’ll share the link here in a couple of weeks when it’s ready.
“This section will outline the importance of ship security, in its recent regulatory context. It will describe the roles and responsibilities of the organisations and individuals involved in merchant ship security.
Security, like safety, is not an object that can be easily defined. It is a relative state, defined by the absence of breaches of security. The objective of maritime security is to maintain a condition free harm or threats to the safety of life and property at sea.
During the world wars of the twentieth century, the lines between merchant ships and warship became blurred due to the modes of warfare and national security employed at the time. The Battle of the Atlantic was a terrible campaign that lasted from 1939 to 1945. During this period many merchant vessels were armed, camouflaged, and grouped into convoys with naval escort, to avoid the attacks of Nazi U-Boats. Over 36,000 merchant seafarers were killed in enemy action, and another 11,000 were wounded or captured, sustaining a casualty rate of 27%.
After the world wars, there has been a widespread trend towards demilitarising merchant shipping. The removal of weapons, camouflage, and naval escorts from commercial maritime operations clearly marks a ‘civilian’ vessel. This makes the application of laws like the Geneva Convention simpler. British tankers no longer carried Royal Marines on trips to the Far East, and civilian vessels were greatly discouraged from carrying firearms in general.
In the postwar years, international politics moved away from a system of competing empires. The institution of the nation state became the primary unit of international law, and nations were invited to become part of the United Nations. Interaction between nation states is now governed by international treaties, and dispute resolution processes.
A ship flying a British flag remains British, in the sense that she must apply the general laws of the United Kingdom on board the vessel. However, the international system means that in most situations she must also apply the laws of the port state or coastal state, over and above those of the flag state. In this environment, the need for standardisation of regulations and practices is clear. Overlapping jurisdictions and vastly different attitudes towards jurisprudence or legal philosophy can quickly become a problem for vessels operating internationally.
The limitations of international law became further evident later. Selective enforcement of treaties and regulations, the use of non-state actors in proxy wars, and the rise of terrorism being obvious examples.
In the early 2000’s, the governments and militaries of the world were very reluctant to allow the use of firearms on board merchant ships. They feared that allowing merchant vessels to carry small arms would quickly lead to an escalating arms race. Ships were also prohibited from boarding armed guards in safe countries, with heavy fines and penalties for those bringing firearms into port. This created a lack of ability for ships to defend themselves against armed attackers. Warlords and gangsters in the failed state of Somalia exploited this defensive weakness and began a campaign of hijacking merchant ships and holding them for vast ransoms.
Those years saw the rise and return of armed security on merchant ships. Staffed by professional operators, usually former members of Western militaries, private maritime security companies grew in popularity. These companies would embark personnel before reaching high-risk areas. The problem of transporting weapons to ships was circumvented largely by the use of floating armouries. The use of unarmed ‘group transits’ through the Red Sea, as well as the distributed use of armed guards was enough to largely suppress Somali piracy to a nuisance level.
For over a decade, the practices demonstrated by these privately contracted armed security personnel have proven effective. Their operating guidelines and methods have spread beyond the Red Sea, to other high-risk areas, and the problem of escalation did not seriously materialise from the pirate gangs or drug smugglers.
Where escalation has been observed in the past 2 years, it has been from politically sponsored non-state actors like the Houthi Rebels. The use of technology sourced from Western nations - supplied and financed by Iran, China, and the Russian Federation – has seen guided weapons, missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices deployed in the Red Sea. The use of online AIS platforms, and vessel ownership databases, possibly obtained by cyber espionage, has seen rebels based in Yemen attack shipping using sophisticated targeting criteria. This new and emerging threat remains potent, as the international system seems to lack the mechanisms for decisively ending it”..
As usual, another well written and timely article!